Social (P)references: Exploring How Social Comparison Influences Risk Preferences
Abstract: Many economic decisions are shaped by comparisons with others. This paper examines how observing a peer’s fixed earnings influences an individual’s willingness to take risks by exploiting two online experiments: in the main experiment, subjects choose between a safe payoff and a risky lottery while observing their peer’s earnings remaining fixed and either above or below their own; the control experiment replicates this design without peer information. I find that when subjects observe that peers earn more than themselves, they take on more risk, even though their relative ranking in terms of earnings cannot change. In contrast, allowing the possibility of overtaking or falling behind the peer in terms of earnings does not alter risk-taking. A comparison across experiments confirms that the presence of peer earnings –rather than changes in rank– drives the observed increase in risk-taking.
Seller Collusion in Two-Sided Markets
Abstract: This paper studies how a platform’s fee structure shapes seller collusion in two-sided markets. I show that higher per-unit fees can sustain collusion by making deviation less attractive. As this allows platforms with a tool to influence seller behavior, platforms may have an incentive to limit competition: colluding sellers extract surplus from buyers, which the platform can capture through its fee. But this creates a trade-off: higher fees encourage collusion, yet may also reduce buyer demand. The optimal fee structure depends on network effects, with stronger effects making collusion less appealing. As a result, platforms may need to adjust fees downward to foster competition, which can be undesirable for them. Established platforms with a strong buyer base, and thus weaker network effects, are therefore more prone to enabling collusion than those still growing.
Platform Fees and Price Recommendations
Abstract: This paper examines how a two-sided platform can use non-compulsory price recommendations to extract surplus and influence welfare. Sellers incur a fixed menu cost when setting prices manually, while the platform recommends a price and charges a fee. I consider two cases: One where the platform charges only a membership fee, and another where it charges only a per-unit fee. I show that price recommendations can coordinate sellers on the recommended price and eliminate frictions caused by menu costs. However, the platform’s optimal use of recommendations depends critically on its fee structure. Under per-unit fees, recommendations uniformly expand trade, lower prices, and raise welfare. In contrast, with membership fees, the platform may recommend supracompetitive prices, extracting additional rents at buyers’ expense – a mechanism that closely resembles resale price maintenance. When network effects are strong, total welfare can even decline. Thus, price recommendations can be efficiency-enhancing under certain fees but facilitate price coordination under others.
De la Croix, David, Thomas Eisfeld and Maximilian Ganterer (2021): "Scholars and Literati at the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (1700-1800)," Repertorium eruditorum totius Europae, 3, pp. 1-9.
Abstract: This note is a summary description of the set of scholars and literati who participated in the activities of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from its inception in 1700 to the eve of the Industrial Revolution (1800).
Eisfeld, Thomas and Leonhard Knoll (2018): "Risikomanagement in finanzwirtschaftlichen Standardlehrbüchern: Disziplinäre Differenzierung oder Integration," ZRFC - Risk, Fraud & Compliance, 13(1), pp. 23-30.
Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Behandlung des Risikomanagements in den an deutschen Hochschulen am häufigsten verwendeten finanzwirtschaftlichen Lehrbüchern. Dabei zeigt sich sowohl in der inhaltlichen Ausrichtung als auch in der bevorzugten Methodik eine deutliche Heterogenität, die indessen angesichts der mittlerweile stattlichen und weiter wachsenden Literatur zum Risikomanagement nicht zwangsläufig als Defizit anzusehen ist.
2024: 22nd Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Northeastern University (Boston, USA); AMSE Seminar, Aix-Marseille University (Aix-en-Provence, France); CESifo 7th Doctoral Workshop on the Economics of Digitization, University of Warsaw (Warsaw, Poland); EEA-ESEM 2024, Erasmus University Rotterdam (Rotterdam, Netherlands)
2023: 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook Center for Game Theory (New York, USA); EEA-ESEM 2023, Pompeu Fabra University & Barcelona School of Economics (Barcelona, Spain); 50th EARIE Conference, LUISS University (Rome, Italy); EARIE Inaugural Summer School, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (Rome, Italy); 2023 ESA World Meeting, University of Lyon (Lyon, France); 21st ZEW Conference on the Economics of Information and Communication Technologies, ZEW Mannheim (Mannheim, Germany); Oligo Workshop, University of Padua (Padua, Italy); CLEEN Conference, ZEW Mannheim (Mannheim, Germany); AFREN 3EN Digital Economics Summer School, Association Francophone de Recherche en Economie Numérique (Avignon, France); 13th Conference on Economic Design, University of Girona (Girona, Spain); ENTER Jamboree, University of Mannheim (Mannheim, Germany); VfS Annual Conference 2023, University of Regensburg (Regensburg, Germany); 14th International Conference “Challenges of Europe”, University of Split (Bol, Croatia); AMSE Seminar, Aix-Marseille University (Marseille, France)
2022: Winter Doctoral Workshop in Economics, University of Saint Louis (Brussels, Belgium); CORE Brownbag, Université catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); IRES Internal Seminar, Université catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); 5th I.CO.D.ECON (International Conference Of Development and Economy), University of Peleponnese (Kalamata, Greece); ECARES Internal Seminar, Université Libre de Bruxelles (Brussels, Belgium); Summer Doctoral Workshop in Economics, Université catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuv, Belgiume); ECORES Summer School, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Leuven, Belgium); AFREN 3EN 2022 (Digital Economics Summer School), Association Francophone de Recherche en Économie Numérique (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
2021: Competition in Digital Markets Winter School, Pompeu Fabra University & Barcelona School of Economics (Barcelona, Spain); Winter Doctoral Workshop in Economics, University of Namur (Namur, Belgium); CORE Internal Seminar, Université catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
2020: Winter Doctoral Workshop in Economics, University of Saint Louis (Brussels, Belgium); IWABE workshop, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Brussels, Belgium); CORE Internal Seminar, Université catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)