Research 

Work in progress

• Unite and Conquer: Seller Collusion in Multi-Sided Markets
  (Draft available soon. Send me an email for a copy.)

Abstract: This paper explores theoretically the dynamics of (online) marketplaces. We reveal a strong incentive for platform providers to encourage seller collusion, particularly under specific buyer demand conditions. Surprisingly, higher fees promote seller collusion, reinforcing supply-side pricing coordination. The implications extend to policy, emphasizing the impact of demand shocks and user bases on platform behavior. Also, distinguishing between two-sided and supply-side network effects is crucial for policymakers. Our findings unveil the potential for supra-competitive pricing in the era of price-matching algorithms. We propose an innovative policy solution: adjusting platform fees to counter the adverse effects of such algorithms on competition.

• Social (P)references: A Model of Peer-Dependent Reference Points
  (Draft available soon)

Abstract: Standard economic theories assume decision-makers only reflect on their own payoffs when making individual choices without considering what their peers obtain. However, many experimental and empirical findings challenge this assumption. We develop a novel theory that considers social aspects within individual choice under uncertainty. Since a social decision-maker's certainty equivalent is not necessarily unique, we propose two novel specifications for certainty equivalents when decision-makers have allocational concerns. Although our results are still preliminary, we find that our model is apt to explain many of the experimental findings on peer effects on individual choice under risk. Moreover, we show that the precise specification of a peer-dependent certainty equivalent matters.

• Compared to What: Testing Peer-Dependent Certainty Equivalents
  (Draft available soon)

Abstract: In contrast to standard economic theory, many economic experiments report peer effects on individual choices under risk, suggesting individuals have peer-dependent risk preferences. At the same time, tools to discuss peer-dependent risk preferences are limited and oftentimes arbitrary. Based on a novel theory of peer-dependent reference points by Eisfeld et al. (2022), this paper tests different notions of peer-dependent certainty equivalents and their implications on individual risk-taking behavior in an experimental setup. We outline two experiments building on a within-subjects design to test peer effects on individual choice in settings where ranks can and cannot reverse.

Publications

• De la Croix, David, Thomas Eisfeld and Maximilian Ganterer (2021): "Scholars and Literati at the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (1700-1800)," Repertorium eruditorum totius Europae, 3, pp. 1-9.

Abstract: This note is a summary description of the set of scholars and literati who participated in the activities of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from its inception in 1700 to the eve of the Industrial Revolution (1800).

• Eisfeld, Thomas and Leonhard Knoll (2018): "Risikomanagement in finanzwirtschaftlichen Standardlehrbüchern: Disziplinäre Differenzierung oder Integration," ZRFC - Risk, Fraud & Compliance, 13(1), pp. 23-30.

Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Behandlung des Risikomanagements in den an deutschen Hochschulen am häufigsten verwendeten finanzwirtschaftlichen Lehrbüchern. Dabei zeigt sich sowohl in der inhaltlichen Ausrichtung als auch in der bevorzugten Methodik eine deutliche Heterogenität, die indessen angesichts der mittlerweile stattlichen und weiter wachsenden Literatur zum Risikomanagement nicht zwangsläufig als Defizit anzusehen ist.